6 Things You Need To Know About The New House Report On The White House’s Treatment of Benghazi Attacks

The House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Armed Services Committee released its new report today evaluating the Obama Administration’s preventive preparation for and response to the September 11, 2012 terrorist attacks in Benghazi.

The report, based on thousands of pages of written material, classified interviews, and classified staff briefings, confirms that the Obama Administration “failed to comprehend or ignore the dramatically deteriorating security situation in Libya and the growing threat to U.S. interests in the region.”

It also finds that the State Department was pushing a reduction in security personnel in Libya before the attack.

Further, the report finds that security forces were not in an appropriate posture in the region considering that it was September 11th, and that because the White House’s official review of the attacks afterwards were not sufficiently comprehensive, there is still confusion about the roles and responsibilities of key individuals.

As more facts about Benghazi come to light, one thing is increasingly clear: the Obama Administration’s approach to Benghazi holds all the trademarks of incompetence.

Check out the six key findings below, and read the full report here.

I. In assessing military posture in anticipation of the September 11 anniversary, White House officials failed to comprehend or ignored the dramatically deteriorating security situation in Libya and the growing threat to U.S. interests in the region. Official public statements seem to have exaggerated the extent and rigor of the security assessment conducted at the time.

II. U.S. personnel in Benghazi were woefully vulnerable in September 2012 because a.) the administration did not direct a change in military force posture, b.) there was no intelligence of a specific “imminent” threat in Libya, and c.) the Department of State, which has primary responsibility for diplomatic security, favored a reduction of Department of Defense security personnel in Libya before the attack.

III. Defense Department officials believed nearly from the outset of violence in Benghazi that it was a terrorist attack rather than a protest gone awry, and the President subsequently permitted the military to respond with minimal direction.

IV. The U.S. military’s response to the Benghazi attack was severely degraded because of the location and readiness posture of U.S. forces, and because of lack of clarity about how the terrorist action was unfolding. However, given the uncertainty about the prospective length and scope of the attack, military commanders did not take all possible steps to prepare for a more extended operation. 

V. There was no “stand down” order issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi. However, because official reviews after the attack were not sufficiently comprehensive, there was confusion about the roles and responsibilities of these individuals. 

VI. The Department of Defense is working to correct many weaknesses revealed by the Benghazi attack, but the global security situation is still deteriorating and military resources continue to decline.