Special Election Doulbes as Audition for Political Pros

Newly installed Republican National Committee Chairman Michael Steele and Rep. Pete Sessions , R-Texas, chairman of the National Republican Congressional Committee — and their handpicked strategists — are on the line, with the political world watching. A GOP victory would turn a blue seat red and would be touted as the beginning of a national comeback; a GOP loss, on the other hand, could simply be a sign the Republicans’ losing streak hasn’t ended yet.

Republicans began the race heavily favored.

The Hudson Valley district long had been considered a GOP stronghold: From 1979 through 2007, as first the 24th, then the 22nd, and then the 20th District, the area had been represented by Republicans Gerry Solomon and John E. Sweeney. It was lost to Kirsten E. Gillibrand in the 2006 Democratic tidal wave by 15,000 votes. Republicans have a 75,000-vote registration advantage, and President George W. Bush carried the district by 8 percentage points in his 2004 re-election, even as he was losing the state by a landslide 18 percent.

Gillibrand has been appointed to succeed Hillary Rodham Clinton , who resigned from the Senate to become President Obama’s secretary of State.

Complicating matters further for Democratic efforts to hold the seat, the Republicans settled early on their nominee, longtime New York Assembly Minority Leader Jim Tedisco, while Democrats took weeks to determine that their candidate would be Scott Murphy, an investment banker who had only moved into the district three years ago.

Confirming the early expectations, a Siena Research Institute poll released on Feb. 26 showed Tedisco leading by a comfortable 46 percent to 34 percent margin. Murphy was doing a slightly better job holding his base vote (70 percent of Democrats were backing him already) than was Tedisco (who had the support of just 63 percent of GOP voters). But those numbers in the end were fine for Tedisco — because of the lopsided GOP registration advantage in the district, he could afford to hold a smaller percentage of the larger GOP base vote. Just as important, Tedisco was winning handily among the crucial bloc of independent voters, who were breaking 45 percent to 31 percent for the Republican.

It looked like all the Republicans needed to do was run out the clock. Absent any major errors, the election would be Tedisco’s for the taking. So, like the Dean Smith-era Tarheels before the shot clock, Tedisco’s campaign went into a four-corners stall…

…Tedisco’s refusal to do so — simply and clearly opposing the stimulus package — could only have been derived from a belief, warranted or not, that the package was popular among targeted voter groups that the campaign had already concluded it needed as part of its winning coalition (read: independents). But in refusing to take a position, Tedisco’s campaign gave up the strategic edge, let its opponent dictate the terrain of battle, and simultaneously weakened the enthusiasm of its own base.

Letting Murphy define the issue agenda violated one of the essential ingredients for victory: In winning the campaign communications war, it’s not what you’re saying that matters — it’s what you’re talking about.

Compounding its error, the Tedisco campaign not only failed to communicate on a subject voters wanted to hear about, but also continued communicating about matters voters did not want to hear about. The campaign wound up looking arrogant and out of touch — two vices especially dangerous for a candidate who’s been around for a long time…